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Geostrategic Forecasting

Designing Effective Military
Strategies under Uncertainty
G. K. Cunningham
ABSTRACT: The expanding complexity and variety of threats to
national security will require Joint commanders and planners who
champion innovative and comprehensive military campaigns. Thus
to educate future pragmatic practitioners, academic faculty should
devise curriculum which advances beyond formatting of plans and
orders to establish contextual frameworks for strategy.

U

ncertainty remains as inevitable today as it was when Carl von
Clausewitz discussed “‘the fog of war’” two centuries ago.1
Nonetheless, national leaders, whether autocrats or democrats,
set strategic goals which military commanders and planners are obligated
to attain. No matter how “wicked” the problems, the intent of Joint
military planning is to generate practical solutions. The goal should be to
develop leaders capable of “thriving at the speed of war.”2
In the effort to swing the pendulum of possibility as close to the
side of probability as possible, planners must analyze each contingent
environment to generate military actions with speed, magnitude, and
duration.3 This article explores how Joint commanders and planners
should incorporate the principles of operational design to deal with
the wicked, ill-structured problems they confront. It examines the
uncertainties of international security and the potential for use of design
methodology in the development of theater strategy. It considers problems
and challenges inherent in applying military strategy and recommends
Joint professional military education equip commanders and planners to
meet these challenges as a specific outcome of Department of Defense
war colleges and senior service schools.

Wonder and Warning

In the operating environment of the twenty-first century, social,
political, economic, historical, and geographic factors constitute complex,
ever-adapting open systems.4 In warfare, adversaries are simultaneously
protagonists and antagonists engaged in violent, destructive actions
spanning a continuum of activity from cooperation to coexistence
to deadly conflict. Nation-states operate in a condition of enduring
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 101, 140.
2. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “The Character of War,” Joint Force Quarterly 89, no. 2 (April 2018): 3.
3. Clausewitz, On War, 92.
4. Simon A. Levin, “Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, the Unknown and the
Unknowable,” Bulletin (New Series) of the American Mathematical Society 40, no. 1 (January 2003): 3–19,
https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-02-00965-5.
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competition across a shifting continuum of cooperation, competition
below armed conflict, and armed conflict.5
In this state of affairs, framing the operational environment
decades out is difficult and ultimately often inaccurate. Intelligence
estimates, while recognizing the speculative nature of the work,
remain a planning necessity. That said, they uniformly forecast a future
operating environment as bleak as it is uncertain. Worldwide trends
and key developments extracted from the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) main report, Global Trends 2035, include rapid globalization
of technological advancements; workforces shrinking in developed
countries, Russia, and China but growing in poorer, developing
countries; and reduced productivity as global economies contract.
As national interests among major powers diverge, an escalating
terror threat, continued instability in fragile states, the wider availability
of lethal, long-range weapons systems, and the stress of expanding
environmental degradations will disrupt societies and increase the risk
of conflict.6
Accordingly, the accustomed post–World War II order may morph
into more complex and far-reaching arrangements and violence may
be perceived as a primary path to recognition, wealth, and power. Any
victories so gained may be short-lived, however, as state and nonstate
actors alike find it difficult to sustain control in the ever-shifting twentyfirst century international environment.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s futures assessment,
Joint Operating Environment 2035, is equally certain about uncertainty
concluding, “these conditions illustrate contested norms and persistent disorder
in the future security environment.” 7 Nongovernment prognostications
are often equally clouded. The World Economic Forum suggested
US global dominance will fade as power rebalances itself across a
small number of competitors. Most nation-states will endure in nearterm decades but they will become increasingly strained by the rise of
megacities, transnational oligarchs, and even online identities.8

Possibility from Paradox

Despite the likelihood of imprecision if not complete blunder,
strategic planners must consider and incorporate these prognostications
in order to link military campaigning to national strategy effectively
so strategy anticipates national policy outcomes. Clausewitz stated
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), 1–4, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/JDN_pdf/jdn1_19.pdf.
6. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, DC: Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2017), 6, 65–69, https://www.dni.gov/files
/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf.
7. JCS, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2016), 4–20, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine
/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf ?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917.
8. Ceri Parker, “Global Agenda: 8 Predictions for the World in 2030,” Wo r l d
E conomi c For u m, November 1 2 , 2 0 1 6 , https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016
/11/8-predictions-for-the-world-in-2030.
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firmly that primarily, “it is clear that war should never be thought of
as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise, the
entire history of war would contradict us.”9 Military strategy employs
the threat or use of force to change the strategic environment to bring it
into consonance with policy, “the positions of governments and others
cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex environment.”10
Joint planning generally follows a predetermined and heretofore
effective methodology for analysis established in doctrine as operational
design. The methodology can be visualized as a series of questions
(see figure 1) that commanders and their planning staffs might address.

Figure 1. The operational design framework (adapted from Joint Publication 5-0)

Given this doctrinal framework, Joint commanders and planners
face vagaries that provide an apt description of a complex, adaptive
system of systems. It will be increasingly difficult to derive conclusions
from analysis of data-driven intelligence collection, as the variety
of network nodes and possible links between them will proliferate
exponentially in unusual (or even unknowable) physical, behavioral, or

9. Clausewitz, On War, 88–89.
10. JCS, Strategy, JDN 2-19 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), II-1, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis
/JDN_pdf/jdn2_19.pdf.
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functional relationships.11 The validity of any such assessments of future
conditions is unlikely to be easily measurable.12
Moreover, the spectrum of challenges faced by military commanders
and planners includes contingencies where military power, traditionally
applied in large-scale combat, may be of little value. The extensive
logistical capabilities required by modern armed forces in warfare are
equally suitable for humanitarian relief, disaster response, and crisis
alleviation in peacetime. In earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods,
and wildfires, military forces are often the organizations of choice
for immediate mitigation of danger and suffering due to the logistical
resources they can bring to bear.
Often the soldier’s favored means of local transportation, the
heavy-lift helicopter, is the only means available to deliver aid and
supplies to the sites of large-scale natural disasters where great swaths
of infrastructure and utilities no longer exist. These contingencies, too,
must be anticipated and planned for with as much energy and precision
as combat operations.

A Dangerous Enticement

Often strategic thinking is viewed as abstract reflection on strategiclevel products or actions. Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Machiavelli,
Clausewitz, Jomini, Mao Zedong, and others have their advocates.13
But, excessive focus on grand strategy, as enticing as this may seem
theoretically and philosophically, may present a dangerous diversion
to Joint commanders and planners. Grand strategy as an overarching
concept for focusing whole-of-nation resources to realize enduring
national interests, in addition to being hard to define or articulate, may
be neither useful nor achievable.14
Moreover, as a practical matter, US doctrine does not mention
grand strategy as a functioning concept for national security and
military campaigning. National strategy is the highest conceptualization
of enduring, long-term national interests and values, including those
associated with social and cultural issues. National strategy, then, acts as
the “strategy of strategies” reflecting the nation’s predominant, broad,
and comprehensive vision of the role of the United States.15
The president’s National Security Strateg y is the commonly accepted
promulgation of policy guidance as national strategy. Yet the difficulty
comes when trying to apply national strategy to action. The background
canvas is too broad, and the possible mixes of color and texture too
11. JCS, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2014), III-33–III-48.
12. Horst M. J. Rittel, and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,”
Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 155–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730.
13. Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989).
14. Paul D. Miller, “On Strategy, Grand and Mundane,” Orbis 60, no. 2 (2016): 237–47, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2016.01.002.
15. JCS, Strategy, I-2.
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plentiful. It is a relatively facile thing to identify likely major adversaries;
it is quite another to develop practical plans and orders for countering
their influence and deterring or defeating their aggression.
The National Security Strateg y of 2017, for example, presents 99 priority
actions across the whole of government. But these priority actions are not
compared against each other or associated with resource constraints or
operational feasibility. The National Security Strateg y addresses outcomes
and strategic goals but offers little with regard to resource allocations,
fiscal constraints, or military effort, forces, or processes to be set against
potential threats. It is aspirational in nature and relates little specific
planning guidance.

Pragmatism in Planning

While grand strategy is academically appealing, in practice military
commanders and planners cannot luxuriate in theories and lofty strategic
concepts. The contemplation of operational design as described earlier is
a useful methodology to employ to this pragmatic end, but the requisite
framing is often a troublesome enterprise. Strategic guidance is quite
often difficult to obtain, much less understand. Further, William E.
Rapp argues persuasively that it is psychologically, culturally, and even
structurally difficult to communicate across the civilian and military
divide that characterizes strategy formulation at national strategic
levels.16 Framing the operational environment is a complex and nuanceprone venture, demanding multicultural understanding in almost every
instance. This context is culturally ambiguous, situationally convoluted
and unclear, and subject to rapid change.
Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s model of military strategy as national security
supported by a three-legged stool provides a time-tested heuristic that
has become a basic paradigm within current planning. While it has its
detractors, the ends, ways, and means model is ingrained in US doctrine.17
Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (2017) begins with a description of
Lykke’s model: “Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining
how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and
space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated
risks.”18 To the degree these three legs might be misaligned (tilt), the
military strategist would likely encounter risk to assigned missions and
tasks (see figure 2).19

16. William E. Rapp, “Ensuring Effective Military Voice,” Parameters 46, no. 3 (Autumn 2015):
13–26.
17. For a summation of opposing critiques to Lykke’s model, see Gregory D. Miller et al., “A
Dialogue on Strategy: On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means,” Parameters 47, no. 1 (Spring 2016–17):
125–31; and Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters, 46, no. 4
(Winter 2016–17): 125–31.
18. JCS, Joint Planning, JP 5.0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2017), I-1.
19. Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in Military Strategy:
Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1989), 3–8.
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Figure 2. Lykke’s ends, ways, and means model of military strategy (adapted from
Lykke, 1989)

Unfortunately, national-level policy and guidance often misses
elements of the Lykke model integral to its utility, such as the ways in
which a strategy may be implemented or the means by which a strategy
may be accomplished. Unfortunately, national strategy as a primary
vehicle for carrying out policy determinations and achieving political
outcomes and end states, tends to focus on the element of “ends” to the
exclusion of other factors.20 Military strategy requires both coherency
and acceptance of risk.21 Coherency between national or grand strategy
and military strategy becomes hard to maintain when corresponding
national-level guidance or direction is not part of the planning paradigm,
a condition that impedes the assessment of risk.
Exacerbating the challenges of understanding national strategy as
strategic direction are the difficulties associated with the constraints
of limited forces and capabilities. Approaches which rigidly follow
predetermined, assigned geographic theaters or which consolidate
globe-spanning functions will be inadequate to confront, deter, or defeat
adversaries who adroitly integrate and employ military and nonmilitary
power at times of their own choosing. To meet this contemporary
challenge, the concept of global integration was introduced in the
2016 National Military Strateg y and further elaborated two years later as
a planning principle in the chairman’s instruction on the Joint Strategic
Planning System:
Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive Joint Force actions in
time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional,
20. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 7.
21. F. G. Hoffman, “Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations,” Orbis 58, no. 4 (Fall
2014): 472–85.
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multi-functional challenges across all domains. It is a top-down, iterative
process that integrates planning, prioritizes resources, and assesses progress
toward strategic objectives. Global integration ends include enhanced senior
leader decision making, strategically integrated worldwide operations, and a
balanced and lethal future Joint Force.22

A Way Ahead

Operational design methodology provides a conceptual approach
to problem solving well-suited to connecting national strategic policy
guidance with theater strategy policy. The design process begins with
understanding the strategic direction. Yet this step has typically been
very difficult to do given the difference between national or grand
strategy and military strategy as a framework for operational art. But the
linkage is essential if military design is to produce ends that accomplish
the policy objectives mandated by the need to sustain national interests
in the face of dedicated opposition from sophisticated adversaries.23 To
attain this goal, commanders and planners should be well positioned to
employ operational design in formulating military strategy.
Specifically with regard to strategy comprehension and formulation,
the chairman’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)
aligns national- and theater-level strategy to senior-level education for
Joint officers—predominantly in grades O-5 and O-6—and equivalent
international officers and US civilians for service at strategic levels, with an
emphasis on Joint operations. 24 The OPMEP specifies, as a professional
military education outcome, that war colleges must prepare graduates
who are “strategically-minded warfighters or applied strategists who can
execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations.”25 A few
pertinent recommendations for inclusion or application of operational
design as a key topic within program curriculums follow.
First, institutions for Joint professional military education should
give themselves a frank azimuth check to determine they are in fact
accomplishing the objectives set forth by the chairman for these toplevel schools. The tendency appears to be drifting from meeting those
requirements to familiarization with theorists and national policy
as grand strategy. The OPMEP clearly states these requirements are
matters of federal law, not preference, and include not only national
security strategy but “planning at all levels of war . . . [including] theater
strategy and campaigning, joint planning processes and systems . . . [and]
joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of
those capabilities.”26
22. JCS, Joint Strategic Planning System, Chairman of the JCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01D
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), A-1, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library
/Instructions/CJCSI% 203100.01D.pdf.
23. Tami D. Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, December 2015), 6–9.
24. JCS, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01F (Draft)
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2020).
25. JCS, OPMEP, A-2.
26. JCS, OPMEP, A-1.

58

Parameters 50(2) Summer 2020

Second, Joint professional military education must both capitalize
on and foster relationships based on existing alliances and coalitions.
The OPMEP points out that international officers are intended
recipients of US Joint professional military education at senior levels, a
policy in keeping with Tami Davis Biddle’s recommendation: “military
students in particular ought to have every opportunity to learn to see
their world through lenses other than their own. Cultural awareness
and cultural literacy are essential to politics and to strategy.”27 Such
broadening multinational perspectives support the framing of an
operational environment.
Third, curriculum relating to Joint planning must embrace
global integration with enthusiasm and incorporate interagency and
multinational partners as a matter of routine.28 Technological innovations,
economic globalization, and worldwide social changes have altered the
geostrategic landscape such that purely regionally focused planning
will not support decision-making and problem-solving global in scope.
Joint planning across all theaters and functions must apply a holistic
perspective incorporating all elements of power in plans and orders that
inherently reflect a Joint, interagency, and multinational character.
Fourth, the aperture through which senior service colleges view the
Joint planning process needs to widen considerably. Joint Publication
5-0 includes principles of Joint planning, but makes only cursory
mention of the principles of Joint operations, foregoing a discussion
of how to integrate these important operational considerations with
Joint planning in favor of a mere passing reference and a few examples.
In fact, principles of Joint operations are mentioned five times in the
context of validating Joint plans, but never completely listed.29
Rather than setting forth correct principles and concepts and
allowing latitude in applying critical thinking and seeking creative
solutions, planning doctrine has become heavily laden with processbound conceptual rigidity. Operational design was conceived as a
strategic thinking model, an intellectual framework intended to allow
commanders and planners to quickly synthesize information and
intelligence in chaotic, time-constrained conditions, collaboratively
visualize how a Joint operation would unfold, and forge consensus
around the commander’s intent.30 The extensive conceptual coverage of
the four major components of operational design has now been reduced
to a single graphic and a nine-step checklist of actions.31 Top-level war
college curriculum needs to compensate for this flawed doctrine and
urge its correction.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Biddle, Strategy and Grand Strategy, 55.
Hoffman, “Grand Strategy,” 475–76.
JCS, Joint Planning, xix, III-5, V-35, C-6.
JCS, Joint Planning, III-7–III-18.
JCS, Joint Planning, IV-6–IV-7.
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The United States should embrace innovative and comprehensive
military theater and functional strategies. These should reflect widely
conceived, thoroughly coordinated campaign planning that capitalizes
on existing alliances and coalitions, builds partnership capacity, and
enthusiastically embraces global integration.
In a pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty, a professional military
will need to change to accept complexity and risk, rely on adaptability,
and embrace innovation. Educators, especially those responsible for
the development of courses and curricula, should respond to this need
by taking an approach to teaching that itself is less structured and
more holistic.
If Joint professional military education is to seriously concentrate
on the development of adaptive, innovative, chaos-tolerant leaders
“capable of thriving at the speed of war,” then course design and
curricular development must model the creativity and analysis we expect
to produce.32 To educate such practitioners, academic faculty should not
simply address formatting of plans and orders but establish contextual
frameworks for both the strategic planning process and the international
strategic circumstances of each actual crisis or contingency. Such a
perspective should impel top-level war colleges and schools, which are
mandated to focus on strategy and campaigning.

32. Dunford, “Character of War,” 3.

